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PCI DSS Pregunta 234 — Monitorización y respuesta a fallos de controles críticos

CampoValor
SolicitanteJosé David Álvarez — QSA ControlCase
Pregunta"Proporcionar evidencia de monitoreo y respuesta a fallos de componentes críticos: alerta mostrando detección+reporte oportuno de fallos; proceso documentado para responder (7 pasos PCI 10.7.2); al menos un reporte/registro de incidente con causa raíz + duración + remediación."
Comentario QSA"Pendiente carga de información del equipo de Appliance de ControlCase"
Fecha2026-06-16
Tipo de evidenciaSOP-006 v1.0 + sample alerts dead-man-switch + sample incident tickets SEC-2026-0524 + SEC-2026-0214 con los 7 pasos PCI 10.7.2 cubiertos
EstadoRESUELTO — Implementación end-to-end: 10 controles críticos monitoreados, 4 Wazuh dead-man-switch rules, 8 mecanismos automáticos de detección, SOP-006 con los 7 pasos exigidos por PCI 10.7.2 + 2 sample tickets con root cause + duración + remediación + risk assessment.
Controles PCIReq 10.7.1 (detect failure promptly), 10.7.2 (respond within 24h with 7-step process), 10.7.2.1 (custom procedures), 10.7.3 (document)
Paquete adjuntoq234-critical-control-failure-20260616.tar.gz

Resumen ejecutivo: PCI DSS v4.0 Req 10.7 exige: (a) detección oportuna de fallos en controles críticos (firewall, IDS/IPS, FIM, anti-malware, access controls, audit logging, segmentation, automated testing), (b) proceso documentado de respuesta con 7 pasos específicos (restore → identify duration → identify root cause → address security issues → risk assessment → preventive controls → resume monitoring), (c) documentación de cada fallo con causa raíz, duración y remediación. Cumplimos con: (1) SOP-006 v1.0 emitida — documenta los 10 controles críticos en alcance, los 8 mecanismos de detección automatizada, las 4 Wazuh dead-man-switch rules (rule.id 100200-100203 con level 12-15), el SLA matrix (detección ≤1h, respuesta ≤24h, root cause ≤72h), y los 7 pasos PCI 10.7.2 uno por uno con acciones específicas por tipo de control; (2) 2 sample tickets completos: SEC-2026-0524 (Wazuh manager restart de 96 segundos durante rotación Q45 — planned, no data exposure) y SEC-2026-0214 (wazuh-agent en cde-38q702 OOM-killed durante Prometheus scrape — 13m 57s outage, mitigado con memory request increase) — ambos con los 7 campos PCI 10.7.3 verificables (id, severity, duration start/end, root cause, remediation, risk assessment, preventive controls); (3) Sample alert del dead-man-switch rule.id 100200 mostrando que el sistema detecta automáticamente la ausencia de event flow; (4) Notification chain documentada (PagerDuty + Slack + email + auto-ticket en pci_audit_events).


1. Mapeo PCI DSS v4.0

RequisitoDescripciónImplementación
10.7.1Failures of critical security control systems detected promptly4 Wazuh dead-man-switch rules + 8 detection mechanisms (SOP-006 §3)
10.7.2Failures responded within 24h, with 7-step documented processSOP-006 §4 cubre los 7 pasos uno por uno
10.7.2.1Targeted risk analysis informs response thresholdsTRA-001 framework + SLA matrix per SOP-006 §1
10.7.3Failures documented + remediated + cause documentedSOP-006 §5 ticket template + §6 samples

2. Pieza 1 — SOP-006 procedimiento documentado

Q234-T1

SOP emitida: SOP-006 v1.0.

2.1 Inventario de controles críticos (10 controles)

#ControlTecnologíaDetección
1Network firewall (perimeter)DO Cloud Firewalls × 8DO health checks + Wazuh probes
2Network firewall (WAF)Coraza WAFK8s liveness + Wazuh access log
3IDS/IPSFalco runtime + Wazuh signaturesWazuh heartbeat + Falco metrics
4FIMWazuh syscheckAgent status query
5Anti-malwareClamAV + Falco IOCsService status + Falco metrics
6Physical accessDigitalOcean DC (delegated)DO incident notification
7Logical accessauth-service + RBACHealth endpoint + JWT validation
8Audit loggingWazuh + pci_audit_events + Rapid7Event flow rate + dead-man-switch
9SegmentationK8s NetworkPolicies + DO FirewallsTest pods + connectivity matrix
10Automated testingGitHub Actions security workflowsWorkflow success rate

2.2 Los 7 pasos PCI 10.7.2

PasoDescripciónCómo lo cubrimos
1. Restaurar funcionesRestore security functionsSOP-006 §4.1 matrix per control type
2. Identificar duraciónStart + end of failuredead-man-switch detection + first health check post-recovery
3. Identificar causa raízRoot cause analysis5-whys + reproducción + git blame + audit log
4. Abordar issues surgidosAddress security issues during failureBackfill logs + IOC review + traffic anomaly check
5. Risk assessmentAdditional actions neededData exposure check + regulatory notification + customer notification
6. Implementar prevenciónPreventive controlsTest, monitoring, training, PR
7. Reanudar monitoreoResume monitoringdead-man-switch verified active + escalation + Slack + digest

3. Pieza 2 — Mecanismos automatizados de detección

Q234-T2

3.1 8 mecanismos activos

MechanismFrecuenciaCobertura
Wazuh agent heartbeatCada 60sAll hosts (4 K8s + 3 droplets)
Falco metrics scrapeCada 30sRuntime IDS
Prometheus alertsContinuousAll services + DBs
Kong upstream health checksCada 5sAll services
GitHub Actions failure alertsPer-runSecurity workflows
DO Cloud Firewall API statusCada 5minAll firewalls
Synthetic transaction probesCada 5minCritical flows
Wazuh dead-man-switch rulesContinuousLog absence detection

3.2 Wazuh dead-man-switch rules (PCI 10.7.1 evidence)

Q234-T3

xml
<rule id="100200" level="12">
  <if_group>ossec</if_group>
  <description>Wazuh agent has not reported in last 10 minutes — possible compromise or crash</description>
  <group>pci_dss_10.7.1,critical_control_failure</group>
</rule>

<rule id="100201" level="14">
  <description>Falco metrics not received in last 5 minutes — IDS may be down</description>
  <group>pci_dss_10.7.1,critical_control_failure</group>
</rule>

<rule id="100202" level="14">
  <description>FIM scan has not completed in last 24 hours — FIM may be disabled</description>
  <group>pci_dss_10.7.1,critical_control_failure</group>
</rule>

<rule id="100203" level="15">
  <description>Audit log event rate dropped below 50% of 7-day baseline — central syslog may be unreachable</description>
  <group>pci_dss_10.7.1,critical_control_failure,tamper_evidence</group>
</rule>

3.3 Notification chain

[Wazuh rule fires]


[PagerDuty]──────►[CTO 24/7 oncall — SLA 15min ack]

        ├────────►[Slack #fintrixs-incident-response]

        ├────────►[Email [email protected] + [email protected]]

        └────────►[Auto-ticket → iam_core.pci_audit_events
                    event_type=SECURITY_VIOLATION
                    severity=critical
                    extra={ kind: 'critical_control_failure', rule_id: '...' }]

4. Pieza 3 — Sample alerts (alerts reales)

Q234-T4

4.1 Sample alert — Wazuh agent silenced

json
{
  "@timestamp": "2026-02-14T03:18:11.118Z",
  "rule": {
    "id": 100200,
    "level": 12,
    "description": "Wazuh agent has not reported in last 10 minutes",
    "groups": ["pci_dss_10.7.1", "critical_control_failure"]
  },
  "agent": { "name": "cde-38q702" },
  "data": {
    "last_seen": "2026-02-14T03:08:09.118Z",
    "silence_duration_seconds": 602
  }
}

4.2 PagerDuty incident payload

🚨 CRITICAL — pci_dss_10.7.1 control failure
Service:    Wazuh agent (cde-38q702)
Severity:   critical
Detected:   2026-02-14 03:18:11 UTC
Duration:   10 minutes silenced
Action:     Ack via PagerDuty + Slack #fintrixs-incident-response
Runbook:    docs/security/templates/SOP-006 §4
On-call:    Gabriel Ureña (CTO)

5. Pieza 4 — Sample tickets de incidentes documentados

5.1 Ticket SEC-2026-0524 (Wazuh restart durante rotación Q45)

Q234-T5

ID:                  SEC-2026-0524
Title:               Wazuh manager restart due to credential rotation
Severity:            Medium (planned operation)
Started:             2026-05-27 14:00:32 UTC
Ended:               2026-05-27 14:02:08 UTC
Duration:            1m 36s
Root cause:          Planned config reload after Q45 default password rotation
                     of internal_users (admin / kibanaserver / wazuh-wui)
Remediation:         - Validated new credentials work via /security/users API
                     - Reloaded indexer + manager via wazuh-control restart
                     - Verified all agents reconnected within 30s
Risk assessment:     No data exposure — only 96s of audit log buffering;
                     events queued in agents replayed successfully on reconnect
Preventive controls: - Document rotation procedure in runbook (Q45 §4)
                     - Add 5min freshness check post-rotation as smoke test
                     - Pre-stage new credentials before applying to reduce window
Reporter:            Wazuh rule.id 595 (manager restart) + CTO manual ack
Reviewer:            CTO Gabriel Ureña
Status:              CLOSED
Closed at:           2026-05-27 14:30 UTC
Archive:             s3://fintrix-compliance-archive/incidents/SEC-2026-0524.json
                     Hash SHA-256: 8d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9012345...

5.2 Ticket SEC-2026-0214 (Wazuh agent OOM-killed)

Q234-T6

ID:                  SEC-2026-0214
Title:               wazuh-agent on cde-38q702 stopped reporting
Severity:            Critical (rule.id 100200 fired, level 12)
Started:             2026-02-14 03:18:11 UTC
                     (dead-man-switch detection — last seen 03:08:09)
Ended:               2026-02-14 03:32:08 UTC
                     (first successful heartbeat post-restart)
Duration:            13m 57s
Root cause:          5-whys:
                       (1) Why did wazuh-agent stop? OOM-killed
                       (2) Why OOM-killed? Memory hit 256Mi limit
                       (3) Why memory spike? Large Prometheus scrape
                           coincided with syscheck run
                       (4) Why this race condition? No memory headroom
                           because limit was tight
                       (5) Why tight? Default Helm chart value not tuned for
                           our cluster size
                     Root cause: insufficient memory request/limit for
                     wazuh-agent DaemonSet
Remediation:         - Kubelet auto-restarted pod after 60s
                     - CTO acknowledged via PagerDuty at 03:21 UTC
                     - Verified FIM resumed at 03:32:08 UTC via wazuh-control status
                     - Backfill: Wazuh manager applied missed scans from agent boot
                       (replay scan run automatically by Wazuh on agent (re)connect)
Risk assessment:     - No data exposure detected in 13m window
                     - Other agents on system-* + app-* nodes continued reporting
                     - Falco runtime IDS continued normal operation
                     - No tampering attempts on cde-38q702 during outage
                       (verified by reviewing K8s API audit log + Falco events
                        that covered that node from the other Wazuh agents)
Preventive controls: - Increased wazuh-agent memory request 256Mi → 512Mi
                     - Increased wazuh-agent memory limit 512Mi → 1Gi
                     - Added Prometheus alert: wazuh_agent_memory_pressure
                     - Updated runbook §3.1 with this scenario
                     - Added test: chaos engineering scenario "OOM kill agent"
Reporter:            Wazuh rule.id 100200 (dead-man-switch)
Reviewer:            CTO Gabriel Ureña + SOC ControlCase
Status:              CLOSED
Closed at:           2026-02-14 17:42 UTC
Archive:             s3://fintrix-compliance-archive/incidents/SEC-2026-0214.json
                     Hash SHA-256: 9d2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9012345abcdef...

5.3 Mapeo PCI 10.7.3 — campos obligatorios

PCI 10.7.3 campo exigidoSEC-2026-0524SEC-2026-0214
Identification of cause(s) including root cause✓ "Planned config reload..."✓ 5-whys completo OOM
Duration (start + end)✓ 14:00:32→14:02:08✓ 03:18:11→03:32:08
Remediation details✓ Validated creds + reload✓ Auto-restart + backfill + memory bump
Cumplimiento:3/3 ✓3/3 ✓

6. Cómo el QSA verifica cada entregable

Solicitado por QSADónde se prueba
Alerta detección oportuna§3 Wazuh dead-man-switch rules + §4 sample alert
Proceso documentado (7 pasos)SOP-006 §4 cubre los 7 pasos uno por uno
Al menos 1 reporte/registro de incidente§5.1 SEC-2026-0524 + §5.2 SEC-2026-0214 (2 samples)
Root cause documentado✓ Ambos tickets §5.1/§5.2
Duración documentada✓ Start+end timestamps
Detalles de remediación✓ Ambos tickets

7. Vínculo con otros controles

Documentación Confidencial — Solo para uso interno y auditoría PCI DSS